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in Centrally Planned Economies:
The Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe and Mainland China
JERZY F. KARCZ
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
IT IS TEMPTING to consider the transformation of agriculture in our
three areas primarily, if not exclusively, in terms of the interrelationship
between the farming industry and rapid industrialization drives. Two-
sector models on which an analysis of this type could be based are not
in short supply, and it is quite true that the total impact of initial periods
of rapid industrialization on agricultural performance and organization
was very considerable indeed. Yet, we should bear in mind that trans-
formation of agriculture in all three areas has (so far) passed through
three separate stages and that each of these may legitimately be
described as a transformation of its own. Thus, we have some some
reason to inquire into the trends and policies of periods preceding the
industrialization drives. This stage of peasant farming includes changes
in land tenure as well as some other institutional arrangements. At least
Nom: The authorgratefullyacknowledges thefinancialsupport of the
Project on Comparative Study of Communist Societies, University of California,
Berkeley, in the preparation of this paper.
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one authority has recently formulated a comparison between the Chinese
and the Soviet transformation in which the divergent trends during the
precollectivization period play a major role.1 But it is also possible to p'
argue on other grounds that the influence of this stage on the formulation f
of Soviet strategy and the course of agricultural transformation was very s
substantial. r
The second stage of transformation remains to be defined. It is the a
stage associated with the implementation of the initial industrialization
drive in the Soviet Union and the corresponding strategy of "surplus c
collection." In this stage agriculture's contribution to growth is viewed d
narrowly by the planners: for the most part, farming becomes a direct,
rather than indirect, supplier of marketable surpluses and of forced a
savings as well as of labor. During this stage little is done to increase
agricultural productivity, and input supplies tend to be neglected. Farm
incomes and prices as well as trends in terms of trade reflect these goals
quite accurately. d
The strategy of surplus collection leads to the emergence of a set of
institutions designed to implement its particular goals. The Soviet col-
lective farm is one such institution, and there are certain others charac-
teristic of the Soviet command economy, such as the system of material
technical supply, planning through material balances, and certain types
of success indicators. The combined impact of these institutions on
agriculture as an industry is sufficiently strong to result in the emergence
of what may perhaps be called a stage of command farming.2
Actually, it is possible to discern a third stage of agricultural trans-
formation that is not easily contemplated apart from its predecessor. 01
That isthe stage of "decompression" of command farming. While
growth and industrialization still enjoy a priority, the planners no longer
neglect the counterdevelopmental impact of surplus collection on the
agricultural sector. Modest increases in living standards and in farm
productivity become immediate policy goals. A larger supply of inputs 19
andinvestment funds is allocated to agriculture, and efforts are also
made to eliminate some counterincentive features of command farming.
Both the strategy of rapid industrialization and the socialist trans-
formation of agriculture emerged first in the U.S.S.R., and the duration
of each of these stages was considerably longer there than in any other
1Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign
Trade, New York, 1966, PP. 78—82.
2 There is more to command farming than simple imposition of wartime con- 1
trols. In the Soviet Union, at least, command farming has generated a tradition
of its own.Centrally Planned Economies 239
e area. The precollectivization stage of peasant farming ended in 1929.
e The second stage may be said to have come to a close in 1953. Decom-
0 pression is still in progress, and it is by no means clear yet what the
final outcome will be. In Eastern Europe the duration of the first and
second stages was relatively shorter, but we do observe two cases of
reversibility, as Yugoslavia and Poland return to (largely) peasant-type
agriculture in 1953 and 1956 respectively. Here, as well as in the Soviet
Union, the introduction of "new economic models" and their agricultural
counterparts represents the culmination of the decompression effort to
date.
My comments (and detailed knowledge) of developments in China
d are less extensive than for the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. In main-
land China, too, three stages of transformation may be distinguished,
culminating in the "agriculture first" policy of 1961—62. Yet, develop-
ls
: mentsin the second stage, in particular, were strongly influenced by
differences in resource endowments and the much lower level of per
capita food production.
1—
al THE EMERGENCE OF SOVIET
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
The issue of land holding in Soviet Russia was resolved summarily
during the revolution and the civil war: large estates were seized more
r or less spontaneously by village communities or individual peasants.
Just prior to collectivization some 25.6 million households were engaged
in farming, with an average crop area of about four hectares per house-
hold.3
m This agriculture of small peasants succeeded to an astounding degree
ts in recovering from the damage brought by six years of war. By 1925/6—
1927/8 average gross farm output exceeded the level of 1913 by about
g 14 per cent. Livestock holdings were also greater than they had been
at the end of that year. Peasant productive capital was growing at the
annualrate of 5.5 per cent.4 Per head of urban population the volume
er of farm marketings was only 4 per cent below the level of 1909—13.
While grain marketings were only slightly lower, it proved impossible
.gn
Lazar Volin, A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture, Washington, D.C.,
• I 1951,p.13 and Vladimir P. Timoshenko, Agricultural Russia and the Wheat
Problem, Stanford, 1952, pp. 101, 127.
'Voprosy ekonorniki, No. 10 (1966), p. 49.240 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
to reach the prewar level of grain exports.5 This was due in part to
greater consumption in the village and in part to a shift in the structure
of output in response to changes in government procurement prices
undertaken in 1926. The change discriminated heavily against sales of
grain, and producers responded by shifting resources (including pro- t
duced grain) to the production of livestock products.6
All these developments took place within a short period in an environ- 1
ment of a regulated market economy. The tumult of wars and revolution,
however, left some lasting scars of distrust on the peasantry and the )
establishment alike. During the war it had been necessary to requisition c
food, and peasants replied by curtailing sowings and effectively forcing
the introduction of the regulated market in 1921. Two years later, an
abrupt, adverse shift in peasant terms of trade produced another crisis,
which was resolved largely to the satisfaction of the peasants. Within
the government the experience generated an excessive fear of similar
seller strikes in the future.7 ill
The story of the Soviet industrialization debate has been told else-
where,8 and only the briefest summary will suffice here. A strategy of
balanced sectoral growth was ultimately rejected in favor of heavy
emphasis on industry in general and heavy industry in particular, with
special stress on development of key industries such as electric power
and steel. Ultimately consumption was to be reduced or held in check
by low farm prices and by heavy turnover taxes included in retail prices. g
Massive collectivization of agriculture was not contemplated initially.
The decision to collectivize was closely connected with a grain pro- iq
curement crisis of 1927/8. I have argued elsewhere that the crisis tv.
was a natural outcome of certain government policies, but the fact re- re
mains that the difficulties with grain supplies in 1927/8, although avoid-
able, were very real indeed. Solution was sought in arbitrary confisca- id
tions from peasant stocks. Even though this procedure (which copied
the experience of the civil war) was successful, grain exports declined as
substantially. A year later, similar difficulties reappeared. By this time,
the government was committed to a program of rapid industrialization fq
Jerzy F. Karcz, "Thoughts on the Grain Problem," Soviet Studies, April
1967, Pp. 408, 409, 411. t4
6 By 1927/8, grain procurement prices exceeded production costs by 0.4 of
one per cent. Ibid., p. 415.
Although peasant withdrawal from markets could cause difficulties in the
short run, itis difficult to visualize withdrawals persisting over a longer run, as StI'l
long as war-induced shortages and habits of thought no longer dominate behavior.
8 Alexander Erlich, The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924—1928. Cam.
bridge, Mass., 1960, is a standard source on this subject.Centrally Planned Economies
and to the satisfaction of the resulting heavy demand for imports. More-
over, difficulties with food supplies led to the introduction of country-
wide
The difficulties might have been avoided by the adoption of alterna-
tive policies, but in the atmosphere of crisis, administrative convenience
and past experience with procurements suggested a drastic solution.
This was sought in the collectivization drive of 1929/30. By March
1930, over half of the peasant households were in cooperative farms.
Although a brief period of relapse followed, by 1936 fully 90 per cent
of all households were collectivized.
The Soviet government thus applied an essentially short-run war-
economy type policy to the solution of a long-run, structural problem:
agriculture's contribution to economic growth.'° If productivity had not
improved, such a policy could not have been followed in the longer run
without adverse effects on incentives and the size of herds (through the
impact on feed supply). Grain procurements rose, productivity did not
improve and the violent upheaval of the collectivization campaign
increased the already heavy slaughterings of livestock." By the end of
1932 cattle holdings declined by 49 per cent and holdings of pigs and
sheep by 55and64 per cent respectively. Output dipped below the 1928
levels and did not regain them until the excellent harvest year of 1937.
But from the standpoint of agriculture's contribution to economic
growth, the results were not at all unfavorable.12 From 1928 to 1932
the nonagricultural labor force increased 55percent and by 1939, had
increased another 44 per cent. In 1930—31 grain procurements were
twice as large as they had been in 1926—28 and grain exports were
resumed on an unusually large scale. The maintenance of agricultural
exports during 1929—32 enabled the government to finance the entire
increase in the value of imports between 1926/7 and 1932.
But total food marketings declined between 1928 and 1932. An index,
as yet unpublished, of food marketings shows a decline of 20 per cent
during this period. The ensuing difficulties in supply were responsible
for the major Soviet famine of 1932/3. This, incidentally, is the only
Moshe Lewin, La paysannerie etle pouvoir sovietique, 1928—1930, Paris,
1966, p. 260.
10 Karcz, op. cit., p. 430.
11 The decline in herds was due not only to peasant slaughterings just prior to
collectivization,but alsoto shortages of feed,hasty collectivization,lack of
structures and insufficient care.
12 This is based on my paper "Soviet Agriculture: A Balance Sheet," in V. G.



























period in Soviet history during which a reconstructed index of final
industrial product shows a decline.13 d
On the other hand, marketings of major technical crops increased by
36 per cent, reflecting privileged treatment for products of high opportu-
nity cost in terms of foreign exchange.
Finally, we note that the government was able to obtain the bulk of
its food supplies at prices that had changed little since 1928. This,
together with the high rate of surplus extraction and rising retail prices,
enabled the government to divert increased savings to finance the indus-
rialization drive.
B
There was no basic change in Soviet strategy of surplus collection
c
until the outbreak of the Second World War nor, for that matter, was
there any during 1945—52. Some adjustments were made in the institu-
tional structure leading to guaranteed household plots and the introduc-
tion of fixed delivery or payment quotas and of the dual-price system in
state procurements. Urban markets were reopened in 1931. These
measures were aimed simultaneously at the improvement of food supplies
m
through greater marketings and the provision of some undefined real
income floor for the individual member of the collective farm. For all
practical purposes, these changes completed the transition to the model of
"command farming" referred to earlier. This model was subsequently
emulated in the transformation of agriculture in both the Eastern
European countries and in China, and we shall shortly indicate some key a1
features of its performance. It should be noted that a rising trend in
output resulted in an increase in marketings, and food rationing was of
therefore abandoned in 1935. There was also a temporary improvement th.
in peasant real income. In the prewar period, total factor productivity in
agriculture declined. Two independent calculations are available. The WI
first, and the more elaborate, is by D. Gale Johnson, who employed
datafrom his study of Soviet agricultural growth for the National
Bureau of Economic Research. The input index is based on series for fri
capital, current purchases, weighted sown areas, livestock, and labor
(measured separately in man-days and also in numbers employed).
Adjusted 1955 weights were used in calculations for the period 1928—38, ha1
which show an increase of 7 to 19 per cent in the input index (depend-
13 Referenceis to calculations of final industrial product by Raymond Powell,
"Industrial Production," in Abram Bergson and Simon Kuznets (ed), Eco-
nornic Trends in the Soviet Union, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, p. 178. The calcu-
lation in terms of 1928 prices shows no change in output for 1932 and a
decline in 1933. The other two computations (in terms of 1937 and 1950 prices)
show declines in both 1932 and 1933. See also Naum Jasny, Soviet Industrializa- 22-4
lion, 1928—1952, Chicago, 1961, p. 114. toCentrally Planned Economies 243
ing on measurement of labor in terms of numbers employed or man-
days). Productivity indices show a decline of 3 to 13 per cent (with
the difference accounted for by the change in the measurement of the
labor input).'4
A much rougher calculation, using official Soviet data for sown area,
the size of the capital stock (including livestock), and an independent
series for the labor input in man-days, was made by the writer on another
occasion. Two sets of weights were used, based on relative factor shares
of 1958, but with alternative assumptions as to the magnitude of rent.
Between 1928 and 1939 the input indices show increases of 2 to 5 per
n cent and the productivity index shows declines of 4 to 7 per cent.'5
IS
ImportantCharacteristics of Command Farming
fl Detailsof Soviet farming organization need not detain us here. To sum-
marize, we note that it consists of state farms and collective farms
(machine tractor stations, MTS, were abolished in the Soviet Union in
1958). These categories make up the socialized sector. The private
sector comprises the household plots of collective farm members as well
as those of other citizens and such independent farm units as may still
be found in the economy. In the late 1950's, the Soviet private sector
accounted for nearly 40 per cent of output.'6
We now comment briefly on some of the outstanding characteristics
of command farming and their impact, intended or unintended, upon
it the performance of farm units or of the agricultural sector as a whole.
These characteristics developed initially in the Soviet Union, but they
were also found in those East European agricultures that continued to
use the system of command farming.
The farm sector as a whole tended to operate under constant pressure
from national planning agencies to satisfy the growing demand for farm
products. The rise in this demand was due largely to growing employ-
ment outside of the farm sector. Income elasticities of demand for food
have been high. At the same time, state demand for exportable produce
was also high and at times rising. Inputs necessary for the satisfaction
II, 14D.Gale Johnson, "Agricultural Production," in Bergson and Kuznets, op.
cit., pp. 214—218.
u- Karcz,"Soviet Agriculture...," Table 2.
a 16KarlEugen Wädekin, Privatproduzenteninder sow jetrussisclienLand-
wirtschaft, Cologne, 1967, P. 22. In Bulgaria, the private sector accounted for
5- I 22—24per cent of output in 1965. For Hungary, the corresponding figure is close
to 40 per cent.• r
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of this demand were not always provided. National planners frequently a
tended to rely upon the supposed availability of unspecified inputs within Si
agriculture. These pressures tended to place a premium on short-run U
performance of individual enterprisesto the detriment of long-run 0
if
Established regulations on output distribution in the collective farms if
subordinated the return to labor to the task of fulfilling various other it
obligations to the state and the coverage of material expenses. Thus the
necessary level of deliveries or sales to the state was maintained more
orless unaffected by harvest fluctuations, but peasant incentives suf- P1
fered.18
Until 1958 almost the entire stock of heavier machinery including
tractors was concentrated in the MTS (state farms owned their own
machines and tractors). This policy, through which duplication was
theoretically avoided, was originally intended to minimize capital out-
lays and to permit maximum utilization of the capital stock, as well as
to increase the size of the surplus through the extraction of payments
in kind. Problems arose with MTS because of the low quality of their
work and the inability to set up an efficient system of incentives for their
workers, as well as because of difficulties in coordinating their opera-
tions with those of the collective farms.1° In general, planning of output
as well as of livestock herd composition was carried on not on the farm
J itselfbut in the superior administrative agencies. Since these were not tn
directly responsible for the results of their planning, certain inconsisten- ml
des tended to develop between various plan indicators. Moreover, spe-
cialization was often discouraged, as planning agencies tended to divide 1h4
the output quotas among a large number of farms in order to minimize
the risk of failure for the area as a whole.2°
Machinery was allocated to state farms and to MTS within the frame-
work of the supply plan. This was also true of other off-farm inputs, such
did
iT B.Prouza eta!.,ZákladnIproblémysoustavy ekonomickéhofizenIëS
zemédélsivi, Prague, 1963, P. 12.
18 On details of these rules see Arcadius Kahan, "The Collective Farm Sys- we
terninRussia: Some Aspects ofItsContribution toSoviet Economic De-
velopment," in Carl Eicher and Lawrence Witt (ed.), Agriculture in Economic rat
Development, New York, 1964, pp. 251—271.
'9 Lazar Volin, "Agricultural Policy of the Soviet Union," in U.S. Congress,
Joint Economic Committee, Comparisonsof the UnitedStates and Soviet Econ- 24 omies, PartI, Washington, D.C., 1959, pp. 297—299.
20 Jerzy F. Karcz, "The New Soviet Agricultural Programme," Soviet Studies,
October 1965, p.147. On discrepancies between planning of feed output and
numbers of animals in Bulgaria, see Dimitur V. Kinov, Efektivnosr na proizvodst-
h venitefondove v selskoto stopansto, Sofia, 1965,p.47—48. t
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asfertilizers, building materials, or spare parts supplied to collective or
tlY state farms. The principles of planning material-technical supplies were
lfl the same as in the rest of the economy, but in view of the low priority
Ufl of agriculture, the probability of shortfalls in deliveries to farms was
Ufl increased. Moreover, administrative allocation of machinery and current
inputs often neglected the necessary complementarity between individual
31S items.21
ter As noted earlier, a double-price system was introduced at an early
he stage in order to stimulate larger sales to state agencies. These sales
)re permitted the maintenance of base delivery prices at low levels for very
L1f long periods, but the entire system of dual pricing tended to inhibit
rational specialization and to accentuate further the existing differences
-rig between the weaker and the more prosperous farms.22
Nil The low income paid by farms (a direct result of low procurement
'as prices) caused many farmers to rely on supplementary income from the
at- household plot. This became a source of constant friction between the
•as farmers and the government. Locally, the socialized sector and the house-
•ats hold plot competed for labor (during peak activity periods), for feed,
eir and at times for land. The proportion of plot income in total income
eir has been very high—but we should keep in mind that the socialized sec-
ra- tor has always been an important provider of feed for the household
)ut plots.
-rm With the adopted principles that governed product and income dis-
lot tribution in the collective farm sector (payment in kind to MTS, pay-
ment of labor from residue product), calculations for production costs
in the collective farms were made very difficult. None were allowed in
ide the prewar period, however, probably because of the embarrassingly low
•ize level of delivery prices.23
State farms owned machinery directly and paid regular wages, and
problems of coordinating the use of inputs with the MTS or of calculat-
ich ing production costs did not arise. Since state farms as well as the MTS
did not pay for the machinery in the early period, the distribution of
machinery between farms tended to be inefficient. Many of these farms
were set up in order to maximize output, with the result that manage-
De- ment was seldom cost conscious and heavy subsidization was the rule
'mc rather than the exception.
ess, 28PlenumTsentral'nogo Kotniteta Kom,nunisticheskoi Partii SovetskogoSoiuza,
on- 24—26 marta 1965 g., Moscow, 1965, pp. 49—51.
ies 22 Vladimir Vydra, Uloha v ekonomickém svazku dPlnické iiIdya
• ro(nictva, Prague, 1963, pp. 120—122.
28 Nancy Nimitz, "Soviet Agricultural Prices and Costs," in Comparisons of
the United States and Soviet Economies, op. cit., p. 241.
I
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Since the rules of the game were often in direct conflict with the per-
sonal interest of farm managers and farmers, it was necessary to main- tb0
tama large enforcement and control apparatus to regulate procurement cato
and planning. In this manner, a considerable proportion of scarce ad- app
ministrative talent was absorbed in activities that contributed little to sect
increase in productivity. faul
No explicit rental payments were made, and the state attempted to imp
collect a part of the rent through regional variations in delivery quotas
and prices. In practice, grain prices were made to bear the major part
of this burden, since prices of technical crops were generally set at to e
higher levels to stimulate production. The result was that grain tended
to be consistently undervalued in spite of the fact that it was continu-
f
ouslyin short supply for animal consumption.24
Nor was there much scope for the supply of those "new factors of The
production" that are responsible for such a large proportion of the in- Were
creases in factor productivity. Younger and better trained workers
tended to leave agriculture for other occupations providing a more were
regular income. Many of the specialists trained for agricultural occupa-
tions tended to follow suit partly because of the low and at times very the p
primitive living conditions in the villages. The introduction of new of•
strains of crops or better varieties of livestock was often hampered or
delayed by changes in procurement quotas that resulted in deliveries of
breeding stock or quality seed.25 put
Finally, we should note one characteristic of collectivized, as distin-
guished from command, farming found in the practice of the Soviet
Union as well as elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Although it might have if
p
been feasible to leave the livestock sector largely in private hands, as is
often done in the case of present day East German and Polish collec-
Jo
tives, attempts were made to introduce collectivized animal husbandry.
The capital costs of construction were of course considerable, and the
problem was accentuated by widespread shortages of materials. Nor was the in
it easy to avoid the spread of tuberculosis or brucellosis under those in
circumstances. In many instances, livestock suffered from a shortage in agt
of stalls. tive ij
24 This was a phenomenon that was encountered in all countries of the socialist 26
camp. If we abstract from the Soviet expansion of grain production in the New 3
Lands, grain acreage tended to decline in all other countries of the camp between 22 T-.
1957 and 1962. Cf. Ukazatelé hospodáfského v zahraniëI, 1965, Part 2, my
Prague, 1966, pp. 48—49. the
25 Douglas Diamond, "Trends in Output, Inputs and Factor Productivity in 26
Soviet Agriculture," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, New Direc- that hf
tions in the Soviet Economy, Part Il-B, Washington, D.C., 1966, pp. 360—363. by So
I
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One last problem should be mentioned. In the course of collectiviza-
tion of agriculture, special efforts were made to publish only those indi-
cators that tended to present developments in a favorable light. It now
appears that major decisions on resource allocation between the various
sectors of the economy were at times based on information provided by
faulty but readily available statistical indicators. In one such case an
improperly calculated rate of investment for Czechoslovak collectives
showed an increase over a period of four years; actually the rate had
declined. Thus, the information problem was often another impediment
to efficient farming.26
The first attempts at mitigating the environment of command farming
were made in 1953 in the Soviet Union.27 Emphasis was placed on
acreage expansion in the New Lands, but a number of other measures
were introduced elsewhere as well. In the short space of five years, the
price level was raised by a factor of 2.7, agricultural taxes (imposed on
the private plot) were cut by 60 per cent in two years, and the volume
of capital in agriculture almost doubled, with allocations of fertilizer
rising by 59 per cent. The quality of feed, and in many instances its
supply, was increased by the corn program. In response to all this, out-
put rose: in the increase amounted to 51 per cent.
The period was also characterized by sharp increases in productivity.
Johnson's calculation (referred to above) shows an increase of 30 to
34 per cent between 1950 and 1959. Another careful study by Douglas
Diamond (also based on reconstructed input series and a recomputed
index of output) shows an increase of 20 to 22 per cent during the
same period. Among the factors that contributed to the increase in
productivity, Diamond cites a doubling of real payments to collective
farm members between 1953 and 1958. Other beneficial factors include
the improvement in the quality of the labor force (through an increase
in the share of able-bodied farmers), the rise in the number of specialists
in agriculture, permissive policies towards the private plot, and the posi-
tive impact of the New Lands and corn campaigns.28
2°Jozef Nikl in Politickdekoizornie,No. 6 (1963), p. 457,andin Statistika,
No.3(1967), p. 117.
27 There is by now a large literature on this period. The main titles are given in
my "Seven Years on the Farm: Retrospect and Prospect,in Directions in
the SovietEconomy, p.399, n. 41.
28 Johnson, op. cit.,p. 218 and Diamond, op. cit.,p. 352. Johnson suggests
that his index may be too high because of the likely overstatement of output
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In 1958, however, priorities shifted against agriculture. Deliveries of a
machinery declined as did the rate of increase in fertilizer allocations. e
Prices of machinery and of spare parts were raised, while newly set c
farm prices were cut. In 1959 and 1960 the real value of earnings per p
man-day from collective farms declined by 10 per cent. Restrictions on
private plot farming caused further reductions. The outflow of labor o
from collectives increased while the quality of the labor declined.29 i1
Though input supplies, including investment allocations, improved
after 1962, productivity indices for 1961—64 show a small decline.30
0
ti
TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE 0
INEASTERN EUROPE
InPoland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia inequalities in land holdings
were already burning political issues before World War II. Hence, land
C
reformsimplemented in the postwar period were also affected by politi-
cal considerations. In the struggle with the remaining political parties,
the Communist parties often sought to neutralize a considerable segment p
of the farm population through the support of land reforms. They were
often very successful.31
b In Eastern Europe as a whole, land reforms affected almost a quarter
of all land used for agriculture and forestry. The state kept about half
of the confiscated land. Large-estate farming disappeared completely
(except on state farms), and most of the land was given to small peas-
ants. After completion of the reforms, small and subsistence farm units
accounted for two-fifths or more of all land in Bulgaria and Hungary
cl and about a quarter of private acreage in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Medium-large and large peasant farms were important only in Czecho-
c slovakia, where they comprised about half of total private land, and in 9
Poland,where they comprised a third. Their share of total private hold-
a
ings in Bulgaria and Hungary was one-fifth and one-fourth respectively.32
It has sometimes been argued that the reforms failed to establish a
sound base for commercial-type farming. In retrospect,it seems that
29 Karcz, "Seven Years on the Farm...," pp.402—410
30 Diamond, bc.cit.
For an excellent study on developments in Poland, see Andrzej Korbonski,
The Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland, 1945—1960, New York, 1965, A
pp. 67—98.
32 Nicolas Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, New York,
[957, p. 245. The small category comprises holdings of up to five hectares, while 191






almost any reform would have led to similar results, since alternative
employment opportunities were small. It also seems likely that with the
choice of proper technology and inputs the base for more intensive and
productive farming could have been laid down.
Nevertheless, after the establishment of Communist regimes, the future
of private farming was grim, although the intent to collectivize was
initially denied. In the early postwar years there was a flurry of collecti-
vization in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but the first major drive came in
Yugoslavia in 1948/9. By the end of 1949 nearly a sixth of all land was
I
collectivized.Thereafter, however, progress was very slow, and in 1953
the government formally allowed dissolution. Within a year the share of
collectivized land dropped from 17 to 3 per cent.33
The campaigns to collectivize in other countries began in 1948/9.
Occasionally the collectivization campaigns were preceded or accom-
panied by campaigns against richer peasants (taking the form of dis-
gs criminatory variations in tax and delivery rates, confiscation of ma-
Id chinery, etc.). The beginning of collectivization corresponded roughly
ti. with the implementation of the first development plans, which contem-
plated high rates of economic growth, especially in industry.
nt The progress of collectivization was by no means uniform. By 1953,
re Bulgaria alone had collectivized nearly half of its land; most of this had
been achieved within a single year in a campaign unique for its forced
er pace. Elsewhere, the progress was slower. Though numerous types of
ilf collectives were set up to ease the process of transition, only 26 to 40
per cent of the land was collectivized in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
The corresponding figures for Poland and Rumania were smaller.34
its During this early period, Soviet planning and pricing practices, in-
cluding compulsory deliveries and dual price systems, were introduced
Ia. in Eastern Europe. To facilitate recruitment, quotas for collectives were
commonly kept low. Crop prices were reduced in Bulgaria between 1949
and 1953 by about 50 per cent; the intent was to raise the rate of
32 saving.35
a The year 1953 brought major policy changes in Eastern Europe. The
lat "New Course policies" resulted in general relaxation of the collectiviza-
tion drive, a reduction in compulsory delivery quotas, changes in prices,
and an increase in agricultural investment's share of total investment.
;ki, Jozo Tomasevich, "Agriculture in Eastern Europe," The Annals ofthe
65, American Academyof Political andSocial Sciences, May 1958, pp. 47—48.
United Nations, EconomicSurvey of Europe in 1960, Geneva,1961, p. IV-5.
rk, N. Dimitrova in ikonomicheskaMisul,No. 7 (1963), p.33. As late as
ale 1956, the total losses of Bulgarian collectives in sales to the state were greater
than total investment in agriculture, state and collective.
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Fundamentally, the reason for the New Course was the same as for the v
Soviet reforms of 1953: stagnation in output. In 1950—53, the level of
prewar production was exceeded only in Albania and Bulgaria (where
the war damage was small) •36
Milder goals for increases in farm output characterized the new wave
of medium-term plans (introduced about 1955). Higher investment c
allocations to agriculture began a trend that, with some exceptions, con-
tinues today. t
The earlier pattern of developments was broken by the events of 1956.
In October nearly 85 per cent of Polish collectives were dissolved spon-
taneously, and no further drives to collectivize were launched thereafter. c
In Hungary, the revolution of 1956 had a similar effect,37 though a few
months later nearly half of the cooperatives were back in operation.
Collectivization drives were, however, resumed elsewhere. Bulgaria
and Czechoslovakia largely completed the process by the end of the
decade, and Hungary renewed the drive in 1959. East Germany collec-
tivized nearly half of its land in 1960. Rumania resumed the drive in
1958 and completed it in 1962. In all countries, drastic decline in herds h
and output was avoided, although periods of stagnation did occur, and
there was some decline in herds.38
By 1965, the socialist sector (excluding the household plots)ac-
counted for the following percentages of arable land: Bulgaria—89;
Czechoslovakia—93; East Germany—95; Hungary—87; Poland—14; e
Rumania—87; Yugoslavia—iS.39 Most of the lower type, looser collec-
tives have disappeared and the more advanced ones have been con-
solidated. The 1959 merger drive in Bulgaria yielded collectives of which
the average size in 1965 was 3,910 hectares. The year before, Hungarian
collectives averaged about 1,200 hectares. The mean size of Czecho- o4
slovak cooperatives in 1965 was 608 hectares.4°
The state farm system also expanded rapidly, in part at the expense
of the private sector (as the state took over land abandoned by mdi-
Economic Survey of Europe in 1960, p. IV-15.
" 1.S. Kuvshinov et a!., Mirovoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo, Moscow, 1966, p. 59
andTomasevich,op. cit., p. 47. See also Korbonski, op. cit., pp. 250, 255 for de.
velopments in Poland.
38 J• M. Moritias, Economic Development in Communist Rumania, Cambridge,
Mass., 1967, PP. 96—97. Large numbers of livestock were purchased by collectives
at rather advantageous prices.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, The Europe
andSovietUnion Agricultural Situation, Review of 1966 and Outlook for 1967,
ERS-Foreign-185, Washington, D.C., 1967, p.113.
40 Kuvshinov, op.cit.,p. 59; Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika




be viduals) and partly at the expense of weaker collectives. In 1962—64.
state farms accounted for between 10 per cent (Hungary) and about 17
per cent (Czechoslovakia) of agricultural land.4'
Reforms of planning, pricing and institutional practices continued.
ye In most instances (with the exception of total or partial abolition of
compulsory deliveries) the Soviet reforms were followed. This was true
of the abolition of dual pricing, of the introduction of machinery sales
to collectives, as well as of the reforms in planning practices. In many
56. instances, the faults, as well as the advantages of Soviet models, were
)fl- copied faithfully, e.g., the setting of livestock product prices below the
':er. cost of production in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
ew What was the performance of socialized agriculture in Eastern Eu-
• rope? The answers depend a good deal on the country and the type of
•na indicator used. Bulgaria an. Czechoslovakia each lie close to, or at the
the opposite ends of, the spectrum. In the former, gross output in 1965 was
ec- more than twice as high as in 1932—3 8. In the same year, Rumanian
in output exceeded its 1938 level by some 40 per cent. In Czechoslovakia,
rds however, prewar levels of output were not recovered until 1960—in the
md next five years, gross output index fluctuated narrowly around that
level.42
ac- The preceding comparisons refer to national indices of gross output.
In the same terms, there were substantial improvements between the
14; early and the late 1950's. The increase ranged between 19 and 23 per
ec- cent for Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland; in Czechoslovakia it was 13
per cent. In part these increases reflect greater allocation of investment
ich funds to agriculture. National data indicate that the share of agricultural
ian in total (or state) investment rose during the same period by a factor
ho- of about
Homogeneous data on trends in the labor input are very difficult to
nse come by. Between 1950 and 1960, however, the decline in total agricul-
idi- tural employment in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
and Rumania (taken came to about 16 per
59 Tractor supplies rose by a factor of 3.4; but since in this period the
de-
4'Kuvshinov,pp. 43—44, 52, 59, 66. In Rumania, state farms accounted for
ives 16.6 per cent of arable land—Montias, op. cit.,Chapter2, Table 1.
42Ibid., Chapter2, Table 6; Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika
•ope Bulgaria 1966, p.172 and Statistickároëenka CSSR 1966, pp.32—33.
•p67, Economic Survey o/ Europein1960, p. IV-15. On volume of investment
see UkazateléhospoddFského vzahraniël1965, Part1, Prague, 1966, pp.
lika 163—170.
sue, Razvitie sel'skogo khoziaistva i sotrudnichestvo strati SEVa, Moscow,1965,
p.101.
I
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number of draft animals declined rapidly, the increase in total draft
power availability was smaller. Substantial increases were also achieved
in fertilizer applications. Here again, the total increase in the supply of
plant nutrients was lower as a result of the decline in the application
of manure (probably greater on the socialized than the private fields)
Trendsin total factor productivity over this period are not easy to f
gauge. I presume that, in spite of substantial outflow of labor, the in- b
creases in the flow of current purchases and of fixed investment (some a
of which contributed little to output in the short run) would probably s
cause a decline in total productivity in the East European countries.
This impression is supported by Western estimates of agriculture's con-
tribution to GNP (Western concept) for the period 1950—53 and 1960—
63. Here, as elsewhere, performance varied, often drastically, from one
country to the next.4°
In the more recent period, indices of net farm output prepared for the SI
area by the U.S. Department of Agriculture show moderate upward
trends for Bulgaria, Poland, and Rumania and more modest increases
for other countries. The outflow of labor continued, with the decline in
agricultural employment estimated at 11 and 12 per cent for Czecho- ti
slovakia and Rumania, respectively, at 15 per cent for Bulgaria and 17 re
per cent for Hungary. Capital productivity, on the other hand, declined ci
by 15 per cent in Rumania, 24 per cent in Hungary, 29 per cent in Bul-
garia and 34 per cent in Czechoslovakia.47 Since 1961, tractor inven-
tories rose at a fairly uniform rate of 50 per cent, while fertilizer appli-
cations registered more spectacular increases, especially in Rumania,
Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary. The last three countries are now ap-
proaching the level of application reached by Czechoslovakia in the
1950's (70—75 kilograms of pure matter per hectare of arable land)
Allthese trends resulted in the continuation of a phenomenon that
was already present in the earlier period. Current expenditures for pro- a)
duction rose still further. In Bulgaria these expenditures increased by
Economic Survey of Europe in 1960, pp. IV-20—IV-21. On the sharp de-
cline in manure applications in Rumanian collectives see Montias, op. cit., Chap- M
ter 2. VI
MauriceErnst, "Postwar Economic Growth in Eastern Europe." in New
I
Directions inthe SovietEconomy,Part IV, p. 884. In general. the more indus-
trialized countries have a far worse record than those with more abundant labor
supplies.
Economic BulletinforEurope, v.18, No.1, pp. 45—47. The index of net
output is in The Europe and Soviet Union Agricultural Situation, etc., p. 5.
Ibid., p. 112. See also United Nations. Econo,nic Survey of Europe in 1965
Part1, Geneva, 1966, p. 33 and Economic Survey of Europe in 1964, Part1,
Geneva, 1965, p. 27. Ii
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44 per cent per hectare of cultivated land in collectives between 1959
ed and 1964. In Czechoslovakia the increase in cooperatives between 1959
of and 1963 was 42.4 per cent. In Rumania material expenditures for
on agriculture as a whole rose by 31 per cent in the period
45 Theonly western index of total factor productivity is that calculated
for Czechoslovakia by Gregor Lazarcik. The index of output-input ratio
in- based on 1936 prices (with inputs aggregated geometrically) declines to
ne a postwar low of 63 in 1947, recovers to a level of 92 in 1950 and only
surpasses the 1936 level by 1958. In 1962 (a very poor harvest year)
es. the index (1936 =100)stood at
In-
0—
ne THE NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
he Since 1965 a number of reforms have been introduced in Eastern Europe
ird with the aim of reducing inefficiencies in utilization of resources, stem-
ses ming from rigidities itt planning and reliance on faulty performance in-
in dicators. In agriculture, the new systems represent attempts to reduce
10- theimpact of command farming on decision making, incentives, and
17 resource utilization by greater use of market type instruments such as
ted changes in prices, taxes, or interest rates.51 These efforts proceed in
ul- several directions.
Greater farm autonomy in decision making is one objective. Indicators
)li- of the national or local production plan are no longer binding on farms.
ia, In theory, production goals were replaced by sale or procurement quotas
after 1955. But in many instances the imposition of procurement goals
:he determined the structure of output almost as effectively as a production
48 plan.Now, the number of quotas is being reduced: irs Bulgaria quotas
will be distributed for only six products. The only physical quotas re-
to- maining in Hungary refer to bread grains, while no quotas are imposed
by on Czechoslovak farms "in ordinary circumstances." In the Soviet Union
de- P.Marinov and N. Andreev in Ikonoinicheska Misul, No. 4 (1966), p. 46;
ap- Montias, op. cit.,Chapter2, Table 12; J. Nikl et al.,Probléinyvüvoje a pldno-
viteho reprodukce v JZD, Prague.1966, p.208.
'ew 50 GregorLazarcik, Czec/ioslovakAgricultural Output, Expenses, Gross and
lus- Net Product and Productivity, 1934—38 and 1946—62, Occasional Paper No. 7
bor of the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe, Columbia
University, New York, 1965, pp. 18—19.
net Thissectionis based in part on my paper, "Some Aspects of New Eco-
nomic Systems in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria," delivered at the Conference on
'65, the Agrarian Question in the Light of Communist Experience, University of
1, Washington, Seattle, August 23—26, 1967. An early publication of the proceed-
ings is expected.r
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efforts were made to stabilize the size of the quota over time and thus c
to facilitate farm planning. In Bulgaria the quotas are supplemented by cr
formal investment ceilings and limits on acreage to be diverted to
orchards or vineyards.52 ef
The extent to which administrative interference in farm planning and a]
management will diminish isstill uncertain. In the past, more subtle p
forms of intervention by administrative officials were devised to circum- w
vent outright prohibitions. Such interference is particularly likely when
administrative officials retain power to allocate industrial inputs or even
to approve financial or output plans of the farms. They are then able to in
direct the structure of farm investment or to impose larger delivery ac
quotas in return for permission to implement profitable investment p1
projects. The apprehension about continued administrative interference psi
is evident in all countries, and efforts are being made in Hungary and of
Czechoslovakia to shift a large part of administrative authority to volun- re
tary associations of farms.53
Efforts are also being made to promote vertical and horizontal integra-
tion of farming, as such, with input-producing and especially with
processing industries. At least a partial duplication of the conditions cct
prevailing in the so-called "agro-business" complexes of the West was
sought in 1967 by the merger in Czechoslovakia and Hungary of a
ministries of agriculture with ministries of food processing and some dii
other administrative agencies.54 The hope is that the reduction in admin-
istrative boundaries will reduce the friction between the farming corn-
munity and the processing industry that led to much waste in the past.
Considerable attention is devoted to the provision of better advisory and
technical services, some of which are modeled on extension services.
Thus, what is sought is the creation of conditions conducive to the use of
new factors of production and more modern production techniques in
the farming community. There is, however, no provision as yet for the ml
inclusion of farm machinery producers within this surrogate "agro- th1
business complex."
Simultaneously, greater emphasis is being placed on the allocative
function of prices. In all countries introducing new systems there were pd
52This reflects the high profitability of grape and early vegetable production
• Bulgaria and the unwillingness of authorities to depend on imported grain. tt4;
'°Theseassociations are to be formed within the framework of the new agro-
business complexes described below.
Moredetailed data are available in Hospodár'ské noviny, No. 13 (1967), in-
sert. The Hungarian reform is mentioned ibid., No. 23 (1967), p.12, It is de-
• Ni1
scribed in detailin Radio Free Europe, Situation Report Hungary, June14,
1967 (mimeographed). ex
I
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considerableincreases in farm prices during 1965 and 1966. These in-
by creases tended to be reflected in higher prices of grains and cattle—the
two product groups that were consistently undervalued in previously
effective price structures. The vast majority of agricultural economists in
nd all countries feel that the level of farm prices remains too low and that
tie prices (along with taxes) continue to be used as an instrument through
which saving is diverted to the central government. The view that prices
en will continue to rise in the future is virtually
en Although marginal cost pricing was advocated by several economists
to in the discussions preceding the introduction of reforms, it was not
accepted anywhere as far as the major products are concerned. The ex-
planation for this is twofold. First, very sharp variations in the level of
ice production costs raised doubts as to the possible counterincentive effect
•nd of the very large tax rates necessary to absorb the major part of quasi
rents. Second, marginal cost pricing in agriculture as well as further
increases in farm prices would be in conflict with the still prevailing
objective of stabilizing the existing level of retail prices.
ith Thus, prices continue to be set more or less at the level of average
ns costs, and the need for subsidization will continue. This is particularly
us apparent in the state farm sector. In the past, state farms benefited from
of a number of privileges that were in part designed to offset the financial
ne difficulties connected with the takeover of the land of weak and inef-
ficient collectives. State farms are now being brought into a competitive
xi- position with collective farms, but the process will take some time. For
St. example, Czechoslovak farms will pay taxes and insurance premiums
out of operating revenues for the first time.56
The need for subsidies in Czechoslovakia engendered an unbelievably
of complex system of prices, premiums, and differential payments, designed
in to preserve the allocative function of relatively low base prices. It is
he impossible to say whether the structure of these prices corresponds to
0- the priorities of the long-run perspective plan for development of agri-
culture, for the excellent reason that the plan has not yet been prepared.
ye Emphasis is also given to the role of credit. In the past, credit often
re performed the function of a "tool for the socialization of the village,"
and whenever the size of repayments relative to farm incomes became
too large, the outstanding debts were written off. This happened in
A numberofrecomputations of agriculture's contribution to the national
product has been undertaken recently. One such calculationisdescribed by 1.
•le- NikI in Poljtjckd ekonornie, No. 7 (1967), pp. 545—554.
• 4, 56 The result is that only 4 out of 329 state farms in Czechoslovakia are not
expected to show a loss in 1967 (interview material).I,
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Czechoslovakia in 1958 and 1967, in the Soviet Union in 1965 (as well Ce
asearlier), and in Hungary in It is now hoped that higher farm pa
prices will make it possible for farms to pay the burden of the remaining in
debt financing in a normal manner. at
The role of the state banks as sources of investment funds has been
widened. In 1967, the State Bank of Czechoslovakia will allocate st
(through its branch offices) about 20 per cent of all investment funds.
About half will be self-financed, while the rest will be covered by direct tn
state subsidies. The rates of interest were raised slightly: they now
amount to 3 per cent for short-term loans and 5 per cent for long-term rn
loans. p1
Under the general rules of the Czechoslovak New System, five-year ha
plans for the economy are to show the level and the structure of farm
prices, tax rates, and interest rates, as well as the availability of credit, cii
off-farm inputs, and other services. On that basis farm planning will iii
continue. But all this is largely in the future, because of uncertainty with
respect to future levels of prices. p1
Much stress is also placed on the introduction of normal—one is th
tempted to say fully commercial—relations between the farm as a seller
of farm products and purchaser of inputs and the various procurement
and supply agencies. In all countries proposals have been advanced
(and in many instances permission has been given) for bypassing of ag
ordinary "commercial" channels by farms, or for establishment of direct tn
contacts between the producer and the processor. These proposals reflect er
uneasiness about the ability of the socialist middleman, accustomed in
the past to local monopolies, to alter his stance in accordance with the ea
desiderata of the new systems.'8
Another objective is further democratization of the collective farm PcI
system, through guarantees of secret elections, and the right to discuss dii
and approve production plans, and the like in direct or representative prj
assembly.
At the same time, attention is also concentrated on the matter of
peasant income. This comes to about 70 per cent of the level of average
earnings in industry (Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia) and some 85 per c4
sec
Interview material. rn Czechoslovakia the write off in 1958 followed a long cd.
standing policy of writing off 5 per cent of outstanding collective farm debts ml
annually. For Hungarian data, see Radio Free Europe, The Hungarian Agricul-
tural Policy After theNinthCongress of the HSWP, April 10, 1967 (mimeo-
graphed). On the Soviet write off see Pravda, March 25, 1965. ni
58Thenew Czechoslovak approachisexplainedinV.Eremiaseta!.,
Dodavatelsko-odbératelske' vztahy a rozvoj ye zdokonalené soustave Fizeni p. t
ze,nédëlstvi, Prague, 1967. BiCentrally Planned Economies 257
cent of the real income of workers and employees in Hungary.59 In the
m past, peasants fared much worse. Guaranteed farm income was first
introduced in Bulgaria in 1962. There are some indications that it led to
an inflation of job norms (the state guaranteed minimum income per
man-day). A similar system of guaranteed wages at about the level of
.te state farm wage rates was introduced in the Soviet Union in 1966.
Pension schemes (which existed in Eastern Europe before their in-
ct troduction in the U.S.S.R. in 1964) have been revised and benefits
raised. In recent years, real income of peasants in most countries rose
m more rapidly than income of workers and employees. If the 1967 Soviet
plan is fulfilled in this respect, real income of collective farmers will
ar have risen by 30 per cent in three years. The new Bulgarian five-year
in plan foresees a faster rise in peasant income than in that of other
•it, citizens, and concern about the persistence of income differentials con-
ill tinues in Hungary.6°
th Concern with the level of peasant income is at least partially ex-
plained by labor supply problems. In East Germany and Czechoslovakia,
is the two most developed countries, labor shortages are frequent: the
er average age of the agricultural worker in the latter country is forty-seven
nt years. But the problem of attracting the specialist—whether a tractor
driver or an agronomist—to agriculture and/or of holding him there
of against the substantial allurements of urban life is present in all coun-
ct tries, including those in which the availability of unskilled labor is gen-
ct erally not an issue.6'
in The new models are being introduced this year and it would be too
he early to pass considered judgment on the results. Some skepticism is,
however, in order because of the dependence of the agricultural corn-
ponent of the "new model" on the appropriate functioning of its in-
ss dustrial component. Even if—and thisis a large if—there were no
ye problems on that score, one would still be entitled to question the wis-
• dorn of directing production through prices of the chosen type, as well
of as the ability to apply unfamiliar tools of economic policy making.
ge 59 Szabad Fold, January 22,1967, asquoted in Situation Report, Hungary, op.
er cit. For Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia reference is to incomes from socialized
sector only. For Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, reference isto income from the
ng collective farm. With private plot incomes the difference is not large, but labor
bts inputs tend to be 18 to 20 per cent higher than in industry or the rest of the
ul- economy.
tO. 60 N. K. Baibakov in Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, No. 51 (1966), and Rabot-
nichesko delo, July 30, 1966.
61 Jilvi Karlik et al., zernkdblstvi a pracovnI oily, Prague, 1967,
p. 45. Difficulties in attracting trained specialists to the village are felt acutely in
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At the same time, even a partial implementation of some of the ob- pa
jectives of the new models should result in direct and noticeable im- sy
provement in efficiency of resource use. And it should be borne in mind flu
that large-scale investment expenditures, a further expansion of mechani- tic
zation as well as of irrigated acreage, and increased fertilizer supplies are
contemplated under the plans running through 1970. Thus, the change
in institutions is also accompanied by a favorable pattern of resource ge
allocation. a
ov
Special Cases: Poland and Yugoslavia r
In these two countries private peasant agriculture still accounts for
about 85 per cent of agricultural land use. Because of limitations of m.
spaceand Yugoslavia's earlier experiments with market socialism, we
will emphasize developments in Poland. 291
In both countries the important sector of socialist agriculture is the
state farm sector. In Yugoslavia, these farms tend to concentrate on crop 3
production, employing modern production techniques, improved seeds,
and large amounts of fertilizers. They also acquire land through pur- pai
chase from the private sector. The Polish state farms are not yet in a
position to serve as models of agricultural technology, but their condi- to1
tion has improved very considerably since 1956. As for the socialization ti
of the village, there is as yet no official Polish policy.62 In Yugoslavia, si
on the other hand, the socialization of the village has been carried out le
as a partthe official policy on land acquisition.
Production trends since 1956—59 for these two countries have not
been markedly different from those for Eastern Europe as a whole. The
net output series for Poland is consistently above the total index for
Eastern Europe; the Yugoslav index fell below the area total in three
out of seven years. The application of fertilizer per hectare of arable
land in Poland is the third highest of the European socialist camp; in
Yugoslavia itis much lower but nevertheless more than double the
Soviet norms.63
Polish peasant farming was incorporated into the centrally planned
economy through a combination of administrative and market stimuli.
Compulsory deliveries still apply to grains, potatoes, and meat. Norms d,
are moderate, and the main aim is to assure minimum supplies of foods,
62Cf.Andrzej Korbonski, "Peasant Agriculture in Socialist Poland since 1956:
An Alternative to Collectivization," in J. F. Karcz (ed.), Sovietand East European S
Agriculture,Berkeley, Cal., 1967, pp. 427—429. See also Joel M. Halpern, "Yugo- sa
slav Peasant Attitudes," ibid., 366.
63TheEurope and Soviet Union Agricultural Situation, etc., p. 5. op
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•;b particularly of meat. In addition, the state uses free purchases and also a
system of contract sales. These have been developed as a method of in-
nd fluencing peasant output decisions and of integrating small-scale produc-
ni- tion into the larger framework of the industrial sector. The area to which
ire they apply is scheduled to reach 30 per cent of total sowing in
ge Farm prices are flexible and usually upward (other measures are
•ce generally used to force acreage reduction). Seasonal price variation is
a common phenomenon. Since 1957 planning has been based on the
over-all principle that the productive capacity of agriculture (rather than
requirements in terms of marketings as has been the case elsewhere in
the socialist camp) shall be the starting point.
[or Since 1956 marketings of the small peasant sector rose by 30 per cent.
of This is less than the 74 per cent increase in the marketings of Polish
we state farms during the same period, but it compares favorably with a
29 per cent increase in the market output of Czechoslovak command
lie farming. Soviet market output rose during the same period by about
op 30 per cent.65
In both Poland and Yugoslavia there exists an important group of
part-time farmers who often derive a considerable portion of their in-
a come from nonagricultural activities. This group is a source of concern
cli- to the authorities because it is less sensitive to pressure to raise produc-
on tivity and therefore less likely to modernize its operations. (In Czecho-
-ia, slovakia also, part-time farming affects the supply of effort to the col-
ut lectives unfavorably.)
Lot
he A SKETCH OF AGRICULTURAL
•or
•ce TRANSFORMATION OF MAINLAND CHINA
,le
in The structure of land holdings in China after the end of World War II is
he not known with certainty, but many western observers believe that ap-
proximately half of the land belonged to the peasants directly. Land re-
•ed form began in 1950; the first measure was a compulsory reduction of
iii rents. Strict rent control was ultimately followed by the seizure and the
distribution of lands. The reform was characterized by apparent leniency
towards some of the richer peasants, who were allowed to keep land
even if it was worked with the aid of hired labor. Considerable violence
an 84 On this subject, see Henryk Cholaj, Kontraktacja produktow rolnych, War-
saw, 1965, Pp. 121—134.
65 Rocznik statystyczny 1965, Warsaw, 1965,p. 219; Statisticka
op. cit., pp. 34—35 and unpublished calculations for the U.S.S.R.5,
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accompanied the reform, however, and the landowner class was elimi-
nated from the country-side, while the ruling party gained in popularity a
among the peasants. The reform was completed in 1952.
On the average, the distribution amounted to about one-third of an 11
acre per household and approximately one head of large cattle per 100 p
households affected by the reform.66 The economic impact was thus
very small. 1
Almost immediately thereafter, efforts were made to enroll the peas- o
ants into mutual aid teams. Such teams were known in parts of prewar
China: they were now organized for the purpose of enlarging the size ii
of worked land holdings and also to prevent the peasant, as Professor d
Eckstein puts it, "from consolidating his gains"—such as these were.
The teams were generally composed of six to ten households. Even in hc
this form of loose association, there was further differentiation between
atemporary and on a permanent basis. By 1954,
there were nearly ten million teams comprising about 58 per cent of all
households.°7
Agricultural cooperatives of various types were then formed by merg- TI
ing mutual aid teams. Less advanced cooperatives worked the land in
common and possessed investment funds. Distribution of income allowed t9
for payment of rents, and private plots were permitted. The more ad- 111
vancedcollectives were modeled more closely on the Soviet type. C
Formationof mutual aid teams and of the early cooperatives pro-
ceeded while the country was already implementing the first five-year
plan (1953—57). The plan gave a priority to industrial development
and was characterized by rising rates of investment and some growth of 4
urbanpopulation. Thus the problem of marketings arose in China.
Compulsory grain quotas were introduced in 1953 and were shortly
thereafter extended to other crops. Growth in marketings was fairly
rapid in 1954 (13 per cent), but in the next year the rate of increase 11
declinedin spite of high delivery quotas that caused some difficulties
with feed and seed in agriculture itself. The correlation between the rate C!
ofchange in agricultural output and that of industrial output is very
high.Thus, in 1955, the government was apparently faced with the
problem of raising industrial output as well as that of increasing market- a
Marion R.Larsen,"China'sAgricultureUnder Communism,"inU.S.
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, An Economic Profile of Mainland China,
Washington, D.C., 1967, pp. 213—214. See also T. J. Hughes, D. E. T. Luard,
TheEcono,njc Development of Communist China, 2nded., London, 1961, pp.
141—147.
Quotation from Eckstein, op. cit., p.73;figuresfrom Larsen, op. cit., p. 217. reCentrally Planned Economies 261
ings. It was, however, unwilling to divert resources from industry to
agriculture.68
Against this background, the collectivization was adopted in
an 1955—56. Although as announced, the plan called for a relatively slow
pace, by February 1956, 85 per cent of households were in collectives
us and the percentage rose to 96.1 per cent towards the end of the year.69
This was apparently achieved without mass slaughter of livestock; total
output rose in 1956 and 1957. This may have been due in part to
the policy, in effect since the beginning of the land reform, of condition-
ze ing of the peasants to constant changes in organization and to the intro-
or duction of mutual aid teams.
re. Yet, the basic problem facing the leadership remained unsolved:
in how to increase farm output without an increase in state investment in
•en agriculture (which would have meant a reduction of resources assigned
4 to industrial development).
au Thebrief experiment with Soviet-type collectives during 1956 and
1957 does not appear to have been particularly successful in this respect.
g- Though output rose, net marketings may have remained approximately
in the same. Within agriculture, there was some tendency to permit decen-
ed tralization of decision making and to pay greater attention to individual
d- incentives. Yet, these improvements were small and they were abruptly
cast aside in the Great Leap Forward of
During a single year, 1958,allof the 740,000 collectives were
amalgamated into some 27,000 communes which took over all adminis-
nt trative functions of government together with responsibility for agricul-
of tural production and initiated unprecedented efforts at capital formation
through giant "community-type" projects directed primarily towards
water management and other land improvement projects. Although the
existing internal structure was preserved (brigades—roughly correspond-
se ing to earlier collectives—continued within the communes and teams
es within the brigades), the entire pattern of farm work was drastically
tte changed. As the communes embarked on large scale projects and con-
struction of local industrial facilities—complete with backyard furnaces
he —they paid less attention to the purely agricultural aspects of their
activities. Egalitarianism, inherent in the assumptions of the Leap For-
ward and ideologically appealing to local leaders, exerted a detrimental
.s.
•10, 68 DwightH.Perkins,"CentralizationandDecentralizationinMainland
China's Agriculture," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1964, PP. 214—215.
Ip. '° Hughesand Luard, op. cit., p. 154.
Perkins,op.cit.,pp. 223—225. On grain procurement statistics and their
7. reliability see Eckstein, pp. 312, 315—3 16.
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influence on rural incentives. Private plots were abolished, food was
provided in communal dining halls, and small cash wages were intro-
duced. These latter, however, were not made dependent upon the
achieved results—as was the case in earlier collectives—but on the
number of hours or days worked. Because of the larger size of the
operating unit, the degree to which wages were detached from per-
formance was correspondingly
The level of food crop production is believed to have declined by
some 14 per cent between 1958 and 1960, while the drop in total farm
output is thought to be considerably greater (number of large draft
animals available was approximately halved between 1958 and 1961).
The decline in food crop production during this time is likely to have
reduced available domestic supplies by 18 to 20 per cent.12
Recognition of the seriousness of the problem was delayed—in part
because of the considerable damage to the statistical apparatus, and in
part because of the euphoria generated by the bumper crop harvest of
1958. As the extent of difficulties became clear, various efforts were
made to reduce the adverse impact of communal organization and of
community investment projects on agricultural production. Rural mar-
kets for farm products were again allowed during 1959 (though there
is evidence of local variation in implementation), and private plots were
again encouraged. Beginning in 1961, the ownership of land devolved
upon production brigades, while various efforts were made to limit the
use of labor on construction projects during peak periods of farm work.
A year later, further devolution of decision-making authority was im-
plemented as production teams stepped up their activities in planning,
performance of tasks, and income distribution.73
The decline in output with the concomitant reduction in agricultural
exports and the shift to import surplus in grains, eventually resulted in
a major shift in developmental strategy. The priority of heavy industry
was considerably reduced, while that of industries supplying agriculture
and producing consumer goods was raised. The rate of investment was
also reduced. The "agriculture first" strategy, then, involved an explicit
recognition of the necessity of solving the basic problems of agricultural
productivity that defied solution within the framework of traditional
formulae involving socialization and "cheap" community projects. A
71SeeLarsen, pp.2 17—219, and Gordon Barrass, "Measures of Economic
1,
Planning," in Werner Klatt (ed.), TheChinese Model,Hong Kong, 1965,p.78. P
11Eckstein,and Edwin Jones, "The Emerging Pattern of China's Economic
Revolution," in AnEconomic Profileof Mainland China, p. 82.
Perkins, p. 232; Larsen, pp. 220—22.Centrally Planned Economies 263
vas restoration of per capita farm output is apparently planned for 1970,
but this goal is not likely to be met. The key role in this task is now
the assigned to the so-called "modernizing areas" which will absorb most
the of the available inputs other than labor.74
the Thus, China finds itself in a position in which the nature of the
er- industrialization strategy, originally patterned broadly on the Soviet
model, had to be basically altered because of stagnation and later
by deterioration in agriculture. In the process, the collective sector was set
back to the position in which it is again found necessary to emphasize
•aft production teams (as in 1954—55). Furthermore, more resources must
1). be allocated to agriculture than before in order to eliminate some of the
ive adverse impact on soil conditions of low quality "improvements" insti-





of Although the common pattern of three stages of agricultural trans-
ar- formation may be discerned in all centrally planned economies discussed
ere in this paper, there were important variations with respect to timing as
ere well as the context in which the phase of surplus collection was applied
ied in these economies, The most outstanding example is that of China,
the where the introduction of communes within the framework of the Great
rk. Forward resultedina dangerous disturbance of the balance
between food production and population growth.
rig, Alexander Eckstein suggests that "the Chinese Communists
relatively successful in the drive to collectivize. . .wereemboldened
.ral to go beyond the tested forms of agricultural and economic organization
in under socialism....Theirsuccess in agrarian policy lay in the tactical
try adaptation of a tested model." This is undoubtedly true, because the
initial collectivization drive of 1955—56 was not accompanied by a
vas decline in output. Yet a related question is in order. I-low relevant was
icit the tested model to the particular conditions of China in 1957? Could
rat it perform its functions satisfactorily without a major shift of resources
to agriculture?
A With the stagnation in government procurements of food crops up to
raic 1957, a negative answer seems indicated. Probably, major shifts in the
•78. pattern of investment were particularly difficult to introduce in 1957, thi'
mic
Larsen, p.224.See also Jones, pp.83—84and Eckstein, pp.37—38.
Eckstein, p.81.
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last year of the first five-year plan. Apart from the matter of prestige,
there must have been considerable complementarity between recent
additions to capital stock and investments contemplated in industry
within the framework of the second five-year plan. Hence, if the leader-
ship opted for the radical solution of the Great Leap Forward, this could
have been the result of failure to visualize meaningful, "second best"
alternatives.
The tested model did not perform well for a number of reasons. The
difficulties associated with command farming must have been particularly
acute in the stage immediately after collectivization, because of the lack
of experience. But this is only a partial explanation. More fundamentally,
it would have been more difficult for the Chinese to pursue the policy of
surplus collection than it was for the Soviets, because of large initial
differences in the food supply position of Communist China and the
Soviet Union. In terms of caloric or grain equivalent the Russians en-
joyed a very considerable advantage over China on the eve of the
industrialization campaign. It was this advantage that could be used in
the process of surplus collection. The Chinese had little room to
maneuver.76
Thus, the one lesson of the Chinese experience with the adjusted
Soviet model is that if a country is to derive the full advantages of the
Soviet development strategy and of surplus collection in agriculture, it
must be sufficiently rich in terms of per capita caloric supplies and be
able (as were the Soviets under Stalin) to make substantial shifts in diet
towards starchy foods.
One could also argue that the adherence to Soviet development strat-
egy and to the policy of surplus collection isa hindrance to speedy
acceptance of those patterns of agricultural transformation that had
been so successful in raising farm productivity in market-type economies.
Command farming is the logical consequence of policies of surplus col-
lection. Furthermore, in the postwar period it was also elevated to the
status of the only available model of socialist agriculture. But the
environment of command farming is basically hostile to introduction of
new technology and to the dissemination of, and receptivity to, informa-
tion on new techniques. We do know now that emphasis on surplus
collection virtually put a stop to studies of production functions and
delayed those on specialization and regionalization. As long as national
policies fail to emphasize rising agricultural productivity, and the total
This has been stressed by Anthony M. Tang in "Input-Output Relations in
the Agriculture of Communist China," a paper deliveredat the1967 Con-
ference at the University of Washington, referred to in n. 51.
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amountof agricultural investment is severely restricted, the supply of
new factors of production, such as better seeds, feed mixtures, and the
like, tends to be limited. Even to the extent that they aresupplied,pro-
ducers may find it physically impossible as well as unprofitable to intro-
duce them into production. If they are introduced, their impact tends
to be reduced by failure to supply complementary factors.
Thus, greater emphasis was placed on the supply of traditional factors
of production (primarily structures and machinery). In Eastern Europe,
the final collectivization drives were generally carried out in the phase
of partial decompression and were accompanied by larger allocations
of investment to farming. Although competition for investment funds
in centrally planned economies remains strong, the share of fixed invest-
ment in estimated GNP (at factor cost) was found to be considerably
greater in most Eastern than in Western European countries. In many
instances, however, productivity of capital was reduced by neglect of
complementarity.77
In centrally planned economies progress in decompression of the
agricultural sectors has not been rapid. Partial attempts at reform were
helpful, but their effectiveness was reduced by the features of command
farming that were retained. Among these, irrational price systems—in
part a legacy of an early Soviet decision to extract forced saving through
prices—are a persisting obstacle to more efficient use of resources.
The introduction of the new economic systems is a vivid testimony to
the dissatisfaction with the realized extent of transformation. As noted
earlier, this stage is now in progress and it seems best to reserve judg-
ment on the extent of transformation that will ultimately be achieved.
If these systems are implemented (and improved), considerable improve-
ment in the use of resources should result. But agricultural reform is
being introduced jointly with reforms in planning of industry, and
progress in agriculture depends to a large extent upon the improvement
in the quality and kind of inputs that industry supplies. Here, too,it
seems best to reserve judgment.
One feature of the general pattern of agricultural transformation in
centrally planned economies has been a shift in expenditures on agri-
cultural development as such, from an early to a later stage of general
economic development. Hence, it is possible to apply resources to other
Maurice Ernst, "Commentary," in Karcz, Soviet and East European Agricu!-
tore, p. 409. Neglect of complementarity has taken a variety of forms. Farms
invested in livestock while the necessary number of stalls was considerably below
requirements. Efficient use of fertilizers was often rendered impossible by the
lack of appropriate machinery. Irrigation facilities were often unused because the
necessary draining ditches were not dug.Jj
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sectors of the economy at an early stage. This may be said to be one of e
the advantages of the Soviet strategy. One opportunity cost, however, fi
represents benefits foregone in the application of new inputs. In ad- s
vanced market economies the rate of return on agricultural research and
extension service activities has been estimated at close to 100 per cent.78 c
As we have just noted, these returns were generally foregone by cen- a
trally planned economies.
This writer ventures the judgment that in Soviet as well as in Eastern t]
European conditions a less exclusive reliance on surplus collection and
greater emphasis on the application of new inputs might have yielded C
superior results in terms of agricultural productivity and of both the
potentially realizable saving and the marketing contributions to growth
consequent on such productivity. There is no doubt at all that this would I
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Professor Karcz tells us at the start of his paper that he will not suc-
cumb to the temptations of theory, and indeed his paper hardly swerves fd
from the path of detailed description and historical analysis. The his-
torical role of agriculture in the Soviet developmental process is so little
known, and Karcz has learned so much about it in the course of years
of research on the subject, that his expertise dictates his comparative
advantage along the lines he has chosen to pursue. I, for want of ex-
pertise, must seek my least disadvantage in the other direction—toward
the theoretical range of discourse if not in theory itself. trl
To justify his rejection of the model approach, Karcz argues that dd
agriculture in the Sino-Soviet area has gone through three separate stages,
As cited in Wyn F, Owen, The Double Developmental Squeeze on Agri-
culture," American Economic Review, March 1966, p. 57.
Ibid., pp. 65—67. In his stimulating study, Owen finds only one real ad-
vantage to the Soviet (in his terms Marx-Leninist) model over the competing
market oriented, family farming (Mill-Marshall) model. Thisisthe virtually
automatic transmission of increments of real income in the nonagricultural
sector to saving (through the system of turnover and profit taxes). As Owen
notes, the problem is primarily one of devising an appropriate tax structure for
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each of which "may be described as a transformation of its own." The
first is linked to the redistribution of landed estates to the peasantry, the
second to the collection of farm surpluses to sustain an ambitious indus-
trialization program, the third and most recent to the decompression of
command farming, when more resources have been allotted to the sector
and an effort has been made to substitute incentives for coercion.
The implication of Karcz's argument is that the objective function of
the relevant decision-makers and/or the institutional framework of the
system are so altered from one period to the other that no single model
can encompass all three.
The merit of this argument depends on our conception of a model and
on the questions one might wish to address to the historical facts. But
I for one would contend that the type of model Ranis and Fei have
built is, to some extent at least, capable of integrating these divergent
episodes and of illuminating the causes and effects of the changes that
occurred. If these models cannot fully capture the diversity and corn-
• plexity of the real world, their excessive degree of aggregation is to
• blame rather than their inability to cope with the broad institutional
changes that marked Soviet and East European agricultural develop-
ment.
• In their book-length analysis of the labor-surplus economy, Fei and
Ranisfocused on the marketable surplus of the agricultural sector in
• its relation to the supply and demand for off-farm workers on the part
of the industrial, or nonagricultural, sector. On the demand side, they
found that when wages were fixed at an institutionally determined level,
the rate of capital accumulation, the intensity of innovations, and their
degree of labor-using or labor-saving bias in the industrial sector were
the key factors governing the growth in demand for laborers on the part
of the industrial sector at an early stage of development. To meet this
demand for labor at a constant wage, however, the agricultural sector
has to generate sufficient agricultural surpluses to keep the terms of
trade from turning against industry. The growth of the industrial sector,
despite a high rate of innovational intensity, is likely to be frustrated
when agricultural output stagnates and farm marketings per nonfarm
employee decline.
The Soviet and East European experience may fruitfully be analyzed
in the context of this model with suitable modifications to fit its institu-
tional peculiarities.
• 1 First, we may note that the policy objective implicit in the Fei-Ranis
1C. H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, Developmentof theLabor Surplus Economy:
Theory and Policy, Homewood, Illinois, 1964.268 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
model is not very different from that which can be imputed to the
planners in a Soviet-type economy, that is, to maximize some combma-
tion of industrial output and nonagricultural employment (although I
should expect that the social welfare function Fei and Ranis had in
mind would give a higher relative weight to the employment criterion
than Communist planners would)Butin any event, agricultural output
both in the model and in the Soviet scheme of development generates
little or no welfare directly. It may be considered an intermediate good,
necessary to the production of industrial goods and to the generation of
nonfarm employment, both of which enter as arguments in these welfare
functions.
Consider the first stage of the evolution described by Karcz. By the
early 1920's in the Soviet Union and soon after the end of World War II
in Eastern Europe, land reform had been completed, and the inde-
pendent family farm had become the principal mode of agricultural
enterprise. Such surpluses as could be spared from on-farm consumption 4
belonged to the farmers themselves and, after governmental obligations
had been met, could be traded directly for industrial consumer goods and
services on the one hand, and capital goods on the other. In the absence
of rent payments to coax out marketings, one might have expected a
marked reversion to self-sufficiency. But as Karcz has shown in his
study of Soviet net marketings in 1926—27 and as the prompt re-
covery of urban food consumption in Poland and Czechoslovakia in the
period 1947—49 testify, marketings, in the wake of land reform, need
not decline drastically and may in fact keep up with the recovery of out-
put. (In the Soviet Union the recovery took place after the ravages of
the civil war (1919—2 1) and in Eastern Europe after the devastation of
World War II and the chaos of the liberation period.) The supply of
light industrial products for sale in rural areas rose fast enough to stim-
ulate peasant marketings during the NEP period in the U.S.S.R. and
in the late 1940's in Eastern Europe. Both urban and rural food con-
sumption per capita were rising. As a first approximation, it may be
claimed that the two sectors grew, or recovered, more or less on a
balanced path, neither sector acting as a serious drag on the other,
given the rates of capital formation and of industrial growth prevailing
2Seethediscussion in Fei and Ranis, op. cii., pp. 139—141.Industrial employ-
mentmay enter as a separate argument in the Communist planners' objective lit
function because ithelpstowiden and to strengthen the power basis of the ruling
Party(cf. the Rumanian argument in favor of protectionism discussed in J. M.
Montias, Economic Development in Communist Rumania, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts,1967,p. 206).
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at the time, rates that were of course much more moderate than in the
period that followed.
Accelerated industrialization dominates the second stage in Karcz's
scheme. Capital formation was raised significantly and channeled to an
unprecedented extent into heavy industry and supporting sectors in-
cluding transportation, wherever bottlenecks arose. We may, as Karcz
and M. Lewin have recently done in their articles in Soviet Studies,3
question whether the Soviet Politbureau in 1928—29 was judicious in
choosing its "time limits." By analogy, the discontinuous acceleration in
the pace of industrialization in Eastern Europe, starting in 1949—50,
may also be taxed as irrational. But if we gauge rationality by planners'
preferences, including the planners' time rate of discount—which must
have been extraordinarily high at the time of the Soviet Five-Year Plan
• and in Eastern Europe in the early 1950's—then the instruments for
carrying out this policy, at least in the agricultural sector, appear to be
• in keeping with the logic of these desiderata.4 For if agriculture was to
make its maximum contribution to domestic saving without absorbing
more than a fraction of investments in fixed capital, the terms of trade
• had to be kept favorable to industry and industrial wages had to be
repressed. Moreover, to assure the flow of farm laborers into industrial
and other occupations, the supply price of farm laborers on the margin
of choice between retaining their agricultural occupation and getting a
city job had to be held down. These aims were simultaneously achieved
by imposing steep schedules of compulsory deliveries to "state funds"
for basic farm products and thus turning the terms of trade sharply
against the peasants. To offset, at least in part, the blunting effect of
these deliveries on incentives, farmers were allowed to sell on the free
markets any surplus they wished to dispose of after their obligations to
the state had been met. The prices on these markets in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe were many times higher than the purchase prices
paid for by the state for compulsory deliveries and for other forms of
more or less obligatory government acquisitions.
A remarkable feature of this first round of intensive industrialization,
J. Karcz, "Thoughts on the Grain Problem," SovietStudies, Vol.XVIII, April
g
• 1967;and M. Lewin, "The Immediate Background of Soviet Collectivization,"
SovietStudies, Vol.XVII, No. 2, October 1965.
In the Soviet case, the logic was probably carried too far. Itis hard to be-
e lieve that any degree of urgency of expanding industrial output could justify the
g hardships inflicted on the farm population, including widespread starvation in
1932—33 and themassive slaughtering of cattle. The East European Corn-
munist leaders learned their lessons from these excesses and followed a more
prudent course in their respective countries in the 1950's.
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both in the Soviet Union and Europe, was that despite stagnant or even
(as in most countries) declining real wages in industry, the capital-to-
labor ratio went up in industry itself and, more generally, in the entire
nonagricultural economy.5 These statements jointly imply a "very labor- t
saving bias" (to use the precise Fei-Ranis terminology) in the aggregate
production function of industry.6 Thus the entire growth of nonfarm
employment in the countries that followed the Soviet strategy of devel-
opment can be traced to the expansion of the capital stock, at least in
the industrialization period under consideration.
This capital-using bias in industry may, at first blush, appear counter-
productive. But this impression must be modified if we take into account f
the costs of rural-urban migration—the additional housing capacity and 4
socialservices that must be provided for new migrants after an initial
compression of the average space occupied per urban dweller.7 The new
industrial laborers may well "carry their average agricultural surplus on '1
their back," as in one variant of the Fei-Ranis model, but they can hardly
bring their cottage and one-room school house along with them. This
may explain why raising the participation of women in the labor force,
with the relatively moderate capital outlays that this entailed, seemed a 9
moredesirable alternative than stepping up the inflow of farm laborers '1
to city jobs, at least after the overcrowding of existing housing and social
facilities in urban areas had reached a certain point. It should also be
recalled that the low priority in the development program of service
sectors with low capital intensity made for a higher average capital-to-
5 For the increase in the capital-to-labor ratio outside Soviet agriculture in the
1930's, see Richard Moorsteen and Raymond P.Powell,I/ic Soviet Capital i
4
Stock1928—1 962, Homewood, Illinois, 1966, P. 255. Official capital-stock series
in Eastern Europe are generally undepreciated and based on originalvalue.
Nevertheless, even if a generous allowance be made for the overstatement of the
growth of the capital stock,it would seem that the capital-to-output ratios rose
throughout the area in the early 1950's in industry and, to a lesser extent, in the fJ
nonagricultural, nonresidential sectors of the economy taken as a whole.
I assume here that wages are approximately equal to the marginal value
product in industry. Then, from Fei-Ranis, Op. Cit., equation 7.3, and from defini- ii
tion A3.3, we have: s
— '1K/L<0
4
whereis the growth rate of the marginal product of labor and the Hicksian
labor saving bias, isthe rate of increase of wages, isthe elasticity of the
marginal product of labor with respect to labor (positive by definition), and
isthe growth rate of the capital-to-labor ratio.If iszero or negative and
positive, HL must be negative.
7 For a systematic theoretical discussion of this point, see Gregory Grossman,
"Some Current Trends in Soviet Capital Formation," in Capital Formation and "1
Economic Growth, Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Economic
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labor ratio outside agriculture than if these sectors had been allowed to
expand at the same pace as in market economies.
But whatever the rational or irrational causes of the bias toward capi-
tal intensity, the fact remains that the agricultural working force in the
Soviet-bloc countries declined very slowly—more slowly than in most
Western European countries—particularly in the Soviet Union, Rumania,
Bulgaria, and Poland, the countries where rural overcrowding and hid-
den unemployment were thought to be the most serious prior to indus-
trialization. To this day the labor force in agriculture in the less developed
countries of Eastern Europe makes up a larger share of the total labor
force than in most noncommunist countries at a comparable stage of
development. Compare, for example, Rumania with a national income
per head of 600 to 750 U.S. dollars, and over 50 per cent of the labor
force still engaged in agriculture in the mid-1960's, with Spain and
Portugal—national income per head 350—400 dollars and 500—550 dol-
lars respectively—and about 35 per cent of the labor force still on the
farm.B
Whether the Fei-Ranis model can provide a better insight into Soviet
and East European agricultural policy than a straightforward historical
chronicle hangs on its ability to suggest an economic interpretation for
• Karcz's third stage, which he summarizes as the "decompression of the
command economy." In this stage the terms of trade shift itt favor of
agriculture, recovering some of the ground lost in the second stage.
Mainly through the higher farm incomes resulting from this shift, peas-
ants' living standards improve and the farm sector begins to absorb a
significant share of total investments.
The simultaneous inception of the new stage, after the death of Stalin,
in both the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe is certainly no vindica-
tion of the model, since one would have thought that, if economic factors
alone had been operating, the turning point would have occurred at dif-
ferent dates in countries with more or less surplus labor or which were
recovering from greater or smaller war devastation. No doubt dogmatic
inflexibility played a role in this timing, and in some countries of Eastern
• Europe at least the turnabout was delayed after the old strategy had
reached a point of no return. But it would be futile to deny that even the
most "Stalinist" planners would eventually have realized that the dis-
L incentive effects on output of the old strategy had begun to outweigh
• S For data on the agricultural labor force, see Moorsteen and Powell, op. cit.,
p. 246 (for the Soviet Union); and Maurice Ernst, "Postwar Economic Growth
d in Eastern Europe (A Comparison with Western Europe)," in New Directions in
the Soviet Economy, Joint Economic Committee, 89th Congress, 2nd Session,
Part IV, p. 893.
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its short-term effectiveness in extracting agricultural surpluses and in
getting the swelling urban population fed (at ever so low a standard).
1
The reversal in the terms of trade and the simultaneous rapid increase
in urban real wages that took place after 1953 created a situation akin
to the one described by Fei and Ranis, in which a massive industrializa-
tion drive is eventually brought to a halt by the failure to expand agri-
cultural output.9 In contrast to the case they describe, however, the
growth of industrial output slowed down as capital formation declined, e
but did not fall to zero, although it diminished significantly. Most notable
is the fact that, in the countries of Eastern Europe that were hardest hit s
by the New Course, including Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia,
nonagricultural employment virtually ceased to expand during the years a
following 1953. This shut off the only outlet for the natural increase of
the farm population, whose absolute size actually increased during the
next two to four years.
Except in Bulgaria, where collective farms occupied about 50 per cent
of the country's cultivable area by the time of Stalin's death, it was not
until 1958—60 that the majority of peasants were herded into collectives a
in Eastern Europe (outside Poland, of course, where individual farming
has been permitted to hold sway to the present day). In Rumania, the
only country I have studied closely in this regard, the improvement in
the terms of trade for agriculture ceased about the time of the final col-
lectivization drive.'0 The deterioration that occurred after 1958 seems ej
to have been caused, not by a decline in official procurement prices, but
by a curtailment and eventual near elimination of the free market. Yet
capital investments in the farm sector kept on rising, in large part through
the medium of the machine-tractor stations, which, in contrast to the dl
Soviet Union where they were liquidated after 1959, continued to per- SI
form their traditional role as "vanguard of the proletariat" in the Danu-
bian economies. Collectivization provided an added degree of freedom n_i
for the economic planners who were in a better position than in the ol
past to force the peasants to reinvest—via the "indivisible fund" of the
collectives—a significant share of the gains in real incomes that accrued
to them from larger output and sales.
Far from "decompressing command farming," the rulers of Rumania el
pulled the reins tighter during this period; but they also prudently stepped ti.
up the resource flow from industry to the farm sector in the form of
fertilizers, insecticides, and machinery. This complex policy mix had yet
another dimension: the government now supplied industrial resources
Fei and Ranis, op. cit., pp. 18 1—182.
10M. Montias, op. cit., Chapter 2. it
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in first priority to state farms, which were technically better equipped
to absorb modern machinery and chemicals, and which offered the spe-
cial advantage of marketing the bulk of their production. The Rumanian
planners apparently came to the conclusion that a concentration of inputs
- inthis modern enclave of the agricultural sector would yield a larger
- pay-offin the form of exportable marketings than if they had been spread
e more evenly (and thinly) throughout the sector. The upsurge in food
exports of the period 1958 to 1962, which helped to finance larger raw
material and machinery imports and which was therefore partly respon-
it sible for the acceleration of industrial output that took place in these
years, must have justified this preferential allocation in the eyes of the
authorities.
This success story leads me to a broader conclusion: The performance
e of Soviet and East European agriculture cannot be assessed in terms of
diminishing capital productivity, rising material costs, and of other partial
it indicators. In some countries, like Czechoslovakia, the decision has been
made to let food imports fill the consumption gap created by a stagnant
agriculture. In others, like Rumania and Bulgaria, exports have bought
g critical inputs for the industrialization program. The wisdom of Czecho-
-e slovakia's decision to adopt a British-type strategy hinges on its ability
to increase exports of manufactures pan passu with its rising food and
material requirements. In the case of Rumania, it depends in part on the
- .s external opportunity costs of the resources that have lately been injected
it into the farm sector. Even if the type of industrialization strategy pursued
by the communist states were to lead to a deficit in foodstuffs for the
h entire bloc—a possibility by no means inconceivable in the light of the
e divergent trends in the area as a whole between the consumption of food-
stuffs and their output—this would not necessarily be catastrophic, nor
would it necessarily show the improvidence of the planners' single-
n minded stress on industry. The outcome of such a trend might be good
e
I or bad, depending on the aggregate capacity of the bloc to export non-
food raw materials and manufactured goods to the rest of the world, and
d particularly of course to countries, such as the United States, Canada,
New Zealand, and Argentina, which enjoy a comparative advantage in
exporting farm products. Peter Wiles and the London Economist some
d time ago advocated such a policy for the Soviet Union. It also makes
sense, in my opinion, for the more developed East European countries,
if not for the entire Soviet bloc.
Now that Professor Karcz and other specialists have pinpointed the
various reasons why agriculture in the Soviet bloc is not as efficient as
it might be, further analytical studies of the sector in the wider context
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of these countries' industrialization problems are in order. Changes in
labor productivity in agriculture must be assessed in the light of the
efficient distribution of labor and capital between agriculture and the rest
of the economy. This allocation in turn hinges on the expansion of the
branches of the chemical and machine-building industry that provides
inputs for agriculture, as well as on the trading policy of the Communist
authorities—on their willingness to let the economy become more im-
mersed in foreign trade, either as importers or as exporters of food
products. The Fei-Ranis model, if it can be opened to trade and dis-
aggregated to include some of the variables discussed in the present







Had I, in fact, succumbed to the temptation of using a two-sector model s
as the analytical framework for my investigation,it would probably s
have been of the Fei-Ranis variety. I was, however, charged with the (I
review of the transformation of agriculture in centrally planned econo-
mies and not with the analysis of the role of agriculture in their eco- al
nomic development. But even in the latter case, the required degree of (
suitable modification seems much more substantial than Professor
Montias suggests. Leaving aside the knotty problem of excessive ag-
gregation, we must inevitably face the question of the applicability of
a model based on the existence of surplus labor for the analysis of a
very large and varied area. Even if we ignore the more obvious cases m
of East Germany and Bohemia, there is the difficult issue posed by the
fact that "empirical evidence does not favor the doctrine of an absolute
zero marginal productivity in mainland China's agriculture."' Nor was
the release of agricultural labor a priority objective of Chinese planners.
It is also apparent that Fei and Ranis deal with genuine agricultural
1LawrenceJ. Lau, "Peasant Consumption, Saving, and Investment in Mainland
China," paper delivered at the Conference on "The Agrarian Question in the
Light of Communist and Noncommunist Experience," University of Washing-
ton, Seattle, August 1967.
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surpluses, while those of centrally planned economies are more appro-
priately described as "forced surpluses." This is a matter of consequence
for the functioning of the farm sector. Under the circumstances, I feel
'he more comfortable within the looser (and unavoidably)less precise
es framework of my three stages (it will, of course, be understood that they
differ conceptually from other, more famous, stages that have at times
been used to describe the over-all process of development).
The looser framework also makes it possible to bypass, at this time,
the awkward question of the relation of turning points of the Fei-Ranis
nt model to the actual developments in centrally planned economies. As
'ler Professor Montias himself implies (p. 271), the major turning point
after 1953 was more influenced by issues of dogmatic conformity than by
the purely economic factors that rule the Fei-Ranis turning point.2 From
this standpoint, it is futile to speculate whether or not the "most 'Stalinist'
planners" would—at some point—have called for a turn of the develop-
ment strategy. The fact remains that in the crucial and pathbreaking
Soviet case they did not choose to do so in spite of the mounting evidence
of the negative effects of this strategy on farm output.
It is appropriate to touch, even if all too briefly, on yet another con-
sideration. Professor Montias notes correctly that the Soviet develop-
ment strategy viewed the agricultural output (if not, indeed, the farm
tel sector as a whole) as an intermediate product: final goods are repre-
ly sented by increases in industrial production and nonfarm employment
(p. 268). This view implies that we may ignore the impact of develop-
0- ments within the agricultural sector, including trends in output, as long
0- as the major objectives of the planners' preference function are realized
of (a formulation that takes us a very long way indeed from the emphasis
or on increases in agricultural productivity which are stressed by Fei and
F Ranis3).
Df
I Yet, it is a truism that the quality of the final product depends, inter
a alia, on that of intermediate goods used in its production. To put the
es matter somewhat differently while stressing the issue of forced surpluses,
we could say that it proved possible to treat agriculture as an inter-
te mediate product only at the cost of developing and maintaining the in-
as stitutions of command farming. In a stimulating book, David Granick
'S. has recently suggested that organization may be viewed as a major con-
stituent of a nation's intangible capital," and that organizational changes
• 2 John C. H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, Development of the Labor Surplus
3 Economy: Theory and Policy, New York, 1964, pp. 264- 266.
3lbid., pp. 43ff., 195—199, 214—219.•1
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"can be treated as representing positive or negative intangible invest-
ment."
Viewed in this manner, the institutions of command farming should
indeed be considered as a disinvestment (measured by the discounted
value of foregone income streams). When we recall that command
farming in centrally planned economies also absorbed a very consider-
able amount of capital in the stage of surplus collection as well as in
that of decompression, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
transformation of agriculture in centrally planned economies was very
capital-intensive (as Professor Montias notes, so was the development
of industry). Certainly, trends in capital productivity as well as in
material costs are of some consequence in assessing the total impact of
a development strategy (an issue to which I did not address myself in
the paper).
The attempts at partial decompression as well as the introduction of
the new economic systems in agriculture may thus be viewed as an
effort to increase the volume of intangible national capital. For a variety
of reasons, the gestation period has been—and will probably continue
to be—a long one, but it should ultimately lead to improved decision
making processes as well as to improved incentives. Both form the eco-
nomic content of decompression. It is for this reason, of course, that I
am not perturbed by the absence of recent terms-of-trade effects in Ru-
mania; the stage of decompression of the Rumanian economy as a
whole has barely begun. It is precisely because tangible investments are
being made in Rumanian agriculture and especially in its "modern,"
state farm sector—following the Yugoslav model of seed improvement
and fertilizer application in state farms—that I am willing to predict
the emergence of a stage of agricultural decompression soon.
In closing, one brief comment is called for. I fully agree with Pro- Tc
fessor Montias that the emergence of a net, blocwide, food deficit
need not be a disaster provided that the bloc succeeds in generating a
sufficient volume of good quality exports. (From a different standpoint,
the magnitude of the deficit could raise some questions.) Japan sue- by
ceeded in doing so; but in centrally planned economies this along with
other scenes of the final act, must still be written.
DavidGranick,SovietMetal-FabricatingandEconomicDevelopment:
Practice Versus Policy, Madison, Wisc., 1967, p. 266. See also Chapter 3. I did
not consult this work until after I wrote the paper presented in this volume. Th
in4